On February 1st , 2003 , the seven crew members of the Space Shuttle Columbia perished when the shuttle disintegrate upon reentry into Earth ’s atm . But is there a way that NASA could have rescued the gang while the shuttle was still in orbit ?
bare seconds after Columbia ’s launching on January 16th , 2003 , a cylinder block of froth from the shuttle ’s external tank and move Columbia ’s odd wing , and in all likelihood created a 6 - to-10 - inch diameter yap in the offstage . In the wake of the Columbia disaster , a Columbia Accident Investigation Board ( CAIB ) was formed to investigate all aspects of the missionary station . Their last news report included the section “ STS-107 In - Flight Options Assessment , ” which cater a potential rescue - and - hangout scenario for the shuttle and her crew . AtArs Technica , Lee Hutchinson provides a narrative frame for this scenario , suggesting an alternate universe in which NASA launched an ambitious missionary station to rescue the gang . A rescue charge might have been potential for one key reason : at the time , the shuttle Atlantis was being prepped for its schedule March launch . But there were a number of takings to consider ; for representative , control that the astronauts did n’t inhale deadly levels of carbon paper dioxide :
But even before those decisions could be made , NASA had to make another assessment — how long did it have to ride a rescue ? In tallying Columbia ’s provision , NASA mission planners realized that the most pressing provision issue for the astronauts was n’t running out of something like air or water but accumulating too much of something : carbon dioxide .

Weight is a wanted commodity for spacecraft . Every gram of mass that must be hike up up into cranial orbit must be paid for with fuel , and lend fuel sum up weight unit that must also be paid for in more fuel ( this spiral of mass - begets - fuel - begets - pot is often referred to as thetyranny of the rocket equation ) . Rather than behave up trim “ melodic line , ” spacecraft launching with a mostly fixed intensity of internal air , which they recycle by tote up back component throttle . The space shuttlecock carries supply of liquid oxygen and liquid atomic number 7 , which are turned into gasoline and cycled into the cabin ’s air to keep a 78 per centum nitrogen/21 percent oxygen mixture , similar to Earth ’s air . The crew exhales atomic number 6 dioxide , though , and that carbon dioxide must be remove from the aura .
To do this , the bird ’s airwave is filter through canister filled with lithium hydrated oxide ( LiOH ) , which seize to carbon paper dioxide molecules to take form lithium carbonate crystals ( Li2CO3 ) , thus sequestering the toxic carbon dioxide . These canister are limited - use items , each containing a certain quantity of atomic number 3 hydroxide ; Columbia was equip with 69 of them .
How long those 69 canister would last prove difficult to estimate , though , because there is n’t a lot of hard datum on how much carbon copy dioxide the human body can tolerate in microgravity . Standard mission surgical procedure rule order that the mission be aborted if CO2 levels get up above a fond pressure of 15 mmHg ( about two percent of the cabin air travel ’s mass ) , and mission planners believed they could stretch Columbia ’s LiOH canister provision to cut through a total of 30 days of delegacy fourth dimension without break that CO2 threshold . However , doing so would require the crew to spend 12 hours of each daylight doing as small as possible — sleeping , perch , and doing everything they could to keep their metabolic rates low .

I worked on the provision for the STS-125 deliverance mission , STS-400 . It took 18 month of planning to develop the operation , modify the tools , test and copy the GN&C , EVA , and robotics choreography , and prepare all the paperwork to fulfil everyone that it was a good plan for both orbiters and the gang . The propose plan in this clause would have been even more difficult because there was no chance to use the RMS ( robotic branch ) to make do Columbia . Columbia was n’t carrying an arm , and Columbia itself did not have a grapple fixture that Atlantis ’s sleeve could apply . I am super dubitable that the manual station retention would be doable even just from a propellant standpoint : STS-400 had the crew transfer requiring two days . ( The STS-400 timeline is available online ) For Columbia , that would think manually place - safekeeping for an intact EVA ( 6.5 hours ) , then differentiate until the next EVA is ready , and do another rendezvous and place keeping for > 6.5 hours . I do n’t think there is anywhere near enough RCS fuel to do that .
The only hope that this plan would have ever had would have been if the plan had already been in place prior to Columbia ’s launching , as there is no way on this Earth that NASA would have sanction a flight with untested procedures that could put down both orbiters . As I aver above , the very alike STS-400 flight planning took 18 month ; even if the full NASA work military unit work around the clock , that amount of body of work was n’t going to happen in just a few weeks . Sadly , I ca n’t see a way where this would have in reality been practicable .
Be sure to read the total piece atArs Technica . It ’s bewitching to consider the work that would go into such a delivery mission , even if it was not able to help the Columbia crew .

Columbia Memorial photograph taken by the US Navy , viaWikimedia Commons .
The audacious rescue program that might have saved space shuttle Columbia[Ars Technica ]
ColumbiaNASASpace

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